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Abstract
Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-
making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and
philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard
view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of
evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory
in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability
and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a
critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psycho-
logical framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and
neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory
challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact,
the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to
do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the
convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-
away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with
something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic
description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and
restate their scientific ambitions.
1 Introduction
Dual process theory (DPT) has been playing a prominent role in both the cognitive and
behavioral sciences. The standard view of DPT —also known as the “received view”
(Evans and Stanovich 2013b; cf. Mugg 2016)—suggests that different aspects of
human cognition, such as reasoning, judgment, and decision-making, can be
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categorized according to and/or understood as the result of these two mental processing
types. “Higher” mental processes are depicted as slow, controlled, reflective, serial,
rule-based, effortful, and conscious, and are associated with energy-intensive cognitive
tasks like deductive reasoning and hypothetical thinking. This category of mental
processing is commonly referred to as “System 2” or “Type 2”. By contrast, “lower”
mental processes are depicted as fast, reactive, automatic, intuitive, heuristic, associa-
tive, and unconscious (or preconscious), and are associated with perceptual and
affective operations like attentional cueing and motor-response preparation. This cate-
gory of mental processing is commonly referred to as “System 1” or “Type 1”
processing.1
Over the last few decades, economics has sought increasing support from cognitive
psychology and neuroscience to improve decision models, often employing the con-
cepts and rhetoric of DPT. The first, and perhaps best-known example of this is the
study of judgment and decision-making under risk and uncertainty in the Heuristics and
Biases tradition (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982;
Kahneman and Frederick 2002, 2005). The second is the refinement of intrapersonal
and intertemporal choice models for studying time preferences and self-control prob-
lems (Loewenstein 1996, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole 2002; Bernheim and Rangel 2004;
Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2005; Fudenberg & Levine
2006). Unlike neoclassical decision models that presume agents to be faultless utility-
maximizers and which often resort to ad hoc explanations to justify deviations from
expected utility theory, DPT has provided behavioral economists and neuroeconomists
with psychologically plausible foundations to represent the internal dynamics of
decision-making (Grayot 2019).
DPT has come under intense scrutiny during the last two decades. Cognitive
scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of
the standard view of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance
of evidence in support of it (Gigerenzer and Regier 1996; Osman 2004; Keren and
Schul 2009; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011). Moreover, attempts to modify and
refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional
concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory (Keren 2013;
Mugg 2016; Pennycook 2017; Bonnefon 2018). This should raise concerns for behav-
ioral economists and neuroeconomists who see DPT as providing more than merely
psychologically plausible foundations for their models (cf. Angner 2019). In particular,
it raises the possibility that dualistic decision models in economics are not as descrip-
tively accurate or reliable as economists presume them to be. In fact, the case can be
made that the popularity of DPT in economics has less to do with the empirical success
of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process
narrative provides economists looking to sort out and explain-away decision anomalies
(cf. Grüne-Yanoff 2017; Angner 2019). I argue that the growing number of criticisms
against DPT leaves economists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their
purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give
1 For classic texts on dual processing, see Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), Evans (1989), Epstein (1994),
Sloman (1996), Stanovich and West (2000), Lieberman et al. (2002). For recent developments and modifi-
cations, see Stanovich (1999, 2004, 2009, 2011), Evans (2006; 2008; 2009a, b; 2011; 2012), Evans &
Frankish (2009), Evans and Stanovich (2013a, b), and De Neys (2017).
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up on DPT, or they stick to DPT and revise and restate their scientific ambitions. To
motivate this dilemma, this paper raises two challenges:
The first challenge pertains to how dualistic decision models in economics represent
choice as the outcome of dual processes and/or systems. This challenge is twofold: (1)
In the case of neuroeconomics, DPT has been employed to illustrate how the brain
evaluates prospects and how it executes decisions; this has led researchers to identify
specialized mechanisms and sub-systems in the brain with different mental functions.
However, because DPT is not per se a mechanistic theory, dualistic decision models in
neuroeconomics may exaggerate or distort the roles that mechanisms or sub-systems
play in the valuation of prospects and the execution of decisions. On the one hand, this
may lead to confusion about what, exactly, DPT is meant to represent; on the other
hand, it may render DPT descriptively redundant. (2) However, DPT is far more
prevalent in behavioral economics, with the majority of dualistic decision models
taking a broadly functionalist approach toward the description of the mental processes
that underpin decisions. While this is consistent with the standard view of DPT, it also
means that dualistic decision models in behavioral economics cannot explain in a non-
question-begging way how choice emerges from the interaction of dual processes and/
or systems—that is, not without a supplemental story. This leaves behavioral econo-
mists with two options: (i) bite the bullet and leave the black box of the mind closed;
(ii) use formal constructs from economics to work out the details of how possibly dual
processes and/or systems interact and produce choice. The problem with the latter
option is that the explanatory value of dualistic decision models becomes hostage to the
explanatory value of DPT in general. As we’ll see, this explanatory value is suspect.
The second challenge addresses a more fundamental question with regard to DPT,
namely, how does it distinguish rational from irrational decision processes? Despite
the commonly held belief that System 2 (Type 2) is necessary for, or synonymous with,
rational decision-making and System 1 (Type 1) is either irrational or non-rational,
there are both theoretical and empirical considerations to suggest that this dichotomy is
not tenable, and perhaps in need of serious revision. Hence, economists are overly
optimistic if they think that DPT, construed as a functional framework, provides
dualistic decision models with the normative foundations they require. While this does
not warrant abandoning a dual process view in toto, it certainly calls into question
whether in vogue economic models can reliably predict and/or explain decision
phenomena outside the lab.
Lastly, it should be made clear that the aim of this paper is not to disparage
behavioral economists and neuroeconomists for their attempts to develop more realistic
decision models. Quite the opposite. The aim is to address open questions which
concern DPT as a psychological framework and, to that end, to better understand its
limitations in the behavioral sciences.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys the explicit and implicit
influences of DPT upon behavioral economics and differentiates two styles of dualistic
modeling. Section 3 provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical criticisms of
DPT from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophical psychology: it
discusses the main differences between system-based and type-based theories of
information processing. Section 4 considers the challenges for dualistic decision
models in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, arguing for the limitations of
each style with regard to how they employ DPT. Section 5 then considers whether DPT
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can sustain the normative foundations of economic models given that neither system-
based nor type-based interpretations can cleanly distinguish rational from irrational
decision processes. Section 6 concludes.
2 How Dual Process Theory Made its Way into Economics
Behavioral economics has earned a reputation for being psychologically realistic and
for providing new insights into the hidden processes that govern decision-making. This
is due in large part to mass market publications, such as Dan Ariely’s Predictably
Irrational (2008), Richard Thaler’s Nudge (co-authored with Cass Sunstein 2008), and
Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast & Slow (2011), which portray behavioral econom-
ics as an exciting new discipline that has the potential to unlock the mysteries of the
human mind. This image has been further reinforced by Kahneman and Thaler each
receiving Nobel Prizes for their contributions to economics. This reputation has, in part,
strengthened economists’ faith in the predictive and explanatory power of DPT. In this
section, I make the case that at least two research programs in behavioral economics
have been deeply inspired by DPT (or core features of it). The first, and perhaps best
well-known, is the study of judgment and decision-making under risk and uncertainty
in the Heuristics and Biases tradition. The second is the refinement of intrapersonal and
intertemporal choice models for the study of time preferences and impulse-control.2
2.1 Explicit and Implicit Examples of Dual Processing in Behavioral Economics
In order to appreciate how the dual process narrative has permeated economic decision
research, we need to look at the historical episodes that brought economics and
psychology into close proximity. The development of the Heuristics and Biases
research program is such an episode.
It is now well understood that one of the major threads in behavioral economics,
namely the study of judgment and decision-making under risk and uncertainty, has its
origins in the behavioral decision research of Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974) and
Kahneman et al. (1982)—for historical overviews, see Sent (2004), Heukelom (2014),
Angner (2019). The goal of this research was, primarily, to understand why individuals
tend to make mistakes when forming probabilistic judgments about choices and how to
predict when cognitive load may compromise one’s reasoning ability. The principal
discovery in this research is that individuals often resort to shortcuts and other rules-of-
thumb to facilitate decision-making; sometimes these shortcuts are helpful, but often
they can be biased in ways that undermine one’s reflective or computational abilities.
Original studies posited three primary heuristics—accessibility, representativeness, and
anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Kahneman et al. 1982)—as the likely cause
of reasoning errors; and it was clear that Tversky & Kahneman saw these heuristics as
the result of differential mental processing, consistent with research in social and
2 Although DPT has had a major influence on certain branches of behavioral economics, I’m not here claiming
that all behavioral economic models have been influenced by it. For instance, there is no explicit mention of
dual processing in either Tversky & Kahneman (1992) or Wakker (2010) regarding the psychological
components of cumulative prospect theory. Likewise, there is no mention of dual processing in Laibson
(1997) regarding the causes of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function.
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cognitive psychology of the 1970’s (cf. Shiffrin and Schneider 1977; Nisbett and Ross
1980).3
Subsequent research on psychological applications of the heuristic and biases
research have reinforced the idea that human decision-making involves the interplay
of two types of mental processes (Sloman 1996; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Gilbert
1999, 2002). The most vivid demonstrations of the mind’s two systems are explicated
in Kahneman & Fredrick (2002; Kahneman and Frederick 2005; Kahneman and
Frederick 2007) and Kahneman (2003a, b, 2011) who adopt the terminology (from
Stanovich and West 2000) of “System 1” and “System 2”. For all intents and purposes,
this understanding of System 1 and System 2 bears all the core characteristics of other
system-based interpretations of DPT (see next section). For instance, Kahneman and
Frederick (2002, 2005) claim that System 1 corresponds to “intuitions”, which are
directly informed by the perceptual system, whereas System 2 corresponds to “reflec-
tive judgments”, which cautiously assess intuitions and formulate responses to them:
In the particular dual-process model we assume, system 1 quickly proposes
intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and system 2 monitors
the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override …We
assume system 1 and system 2 can be active concurrently, that automatic and
controlled cognitive operations compete for the control of overt responses, and
that deliberate judgments are likely to remain anchored on initial impressions.
(Kahneman and Frederick 2005, p. 267)
While Kahneman is perhaps the most vocal proponent of DPT, the dual process
narrative has received further support and attention in Thaler’s research on libertarian
paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 2008; Thaler et al. 2012). Thaler appeals to the
differential processing abilities of ordinary decision-makers to justify nudging, i.e.
improving choice architectures through subtle framing interventions. The psychological
evidence in support of nudging comes directly from classic texts in the DPT literature
(e.g., Chaiken and Trope 1999; Lieberman et al. 2002) as well as from the heuristics
and biases research itself (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 2000; Gilovich et al. 2002). For
the sake of space, I will not review Thaler’s conception of DPT as it essentially mirrors
that above.4
Of course, not all dualistic economic models are as explicit about their commitment
to DPT as those in the Heuristics and Biases tradition and nudge research. Another
important episode in behavioral economics in which DPT has played a recurring theme
is the study of intrapersonal and intertemporal choice. Grayot (2019) analyzes how
researchers have attempted to integrate dual process and dual system theories of mental
processing with multiple-self economic modeling techniques, giving rise to a new
breed of psychologically sophisticated “multiple-agent” models. The most cited
3 Kahneman (2011) explains in retrospect that prospect theory was, in essence, a formalization of the dual-
process account developed in Heuristics and Biases research: “Although Amos and I were not working with
the two-systems model of the mind, it’s clear now that there are three cognitive features at the heart of prospect
theory. They play an essential role in the evaluation of financial outcomes and are common to many automatic
processes of perception, judgment, and emotion” (2011, p. 273).
4 For a critical reflection on Thaler’s legacy in behavioral economics, especially with regard to his attempts to
make economics psychologically more realistic, see Grüne-Yanoff (2017).
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examples of this sort of model include Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Bernheim and
Rangel (2004), Benhabib and Bisin (2005), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) and
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), to name a few. In particular, multiple-agent models of
intrapersonal and intertemporal choice have sought to characterize the “contradictory
tendencies of temporally distinct selves by investigating how controlled and automatic
processes influence choice behaviors over time” (Grayot 2019, p. 4). In some instances,
the internal dynamic between intrapersonal selves is interpreted to establish the limi-
tations on the decision-maker’s ability to exhibit self-control; in other instances, the
conflict between desires to consume now or later is interpreted as a ‘trade-off’ which is
determined by the activation of distinct cognitive (or neural) processes.
These less-explicit instances of DPT in behavioral economics reveal that the dual
process narrative can serve different modeling purposes: whereas the former ap-
proaches, i.e. Bénabou & Tirole (2002, 2003), Fudenberg & Levine (2006), adopt a
dual-self model in which the decision-maker is temporally divided, the latter, i.e.
Benhabib and Bisin (2005), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005), start with a con-
ception of the decision-maker who is already psychologically divided into dual-sys-
tems; the model then seeks to understand how both static and dynamic choice phe-
nomena result from interactions between systems.
The table below (Table 1) provides a list of different variations of dualistic decision
models in economics; though they employ different naming conventions, the same
logic applies to all, which is that dualistic structures give rise to internal conflict and
produce different sorts of choice phenomena.
One will notice that the references cited in the table cover a range of modeling
techniques, not all of which are typically associated with behavioral economics (I return
to this point shortly). Nevertheless, they share two things in common which speaks to
the influence of DPT on behavioral economics and neighboring subdisciplines: First,
each adopts an overtly dualistic rhetoric (even if this has no associated theoretical or
empirical commitments). Second, each relies on a codification of the dualistic rhetoric
which results in a constrained optimization model of choice (e.g., principal-agent model
or limited information game). In fact, it’s not hard to see how psychologically sophis-
ticated multiple-agent models in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics emerged
Table 1 Different variations of dualistic decision models
Dualistic label Reference
“Cold” vs. “hot” modes Loewenstein 1996; Bénabou and Tirole 2002;
Bernheim and Rangel 2004, 2007; Ainslie 2001, 2005;
Soman et al. 2005
Cognition vs. emotion Sanfey et al. 2003
Deliberative system vs. affective system Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2005
Cognitive system vs. affective system Camerer et al. 2005
Reflective vs. impulsive system McClure et al. 2004, 2007; Strack and Deutsch 2004;
Fudenberg & Levine 2006;
Controlled vs. automatic processing Loewenstein 1996, 1999; Camerer et al. 2005;
Benhabib and Bisin 2005
Executive control vs. conflict monitoring….. Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Brocas and Carrillo 2008, 2014
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from prototypical “planner–doer” and “multiple-self”models (Thaler and Shefrin 1981;
Schelling 1984; Shefrin and Thaler 1988; Ainslie 1992; Ainslie and Haslam 1992). The
particular arrangement of the planner-doer model indicates that the planner self is not
just farsighted, but that it has rational authority, which is realized when it exerts control
over the doer self. This is a clear indication that economists have sought to resolve the
problem of dynamic inconsistency by invoking asymmetrical reasoning processes,
which may supervene on real psychological or physiological processes. So, while the
case can be made that traditional planner-doer and multiple-self models presuppose a
kind of differential mental processing, the behavioral economic models listed in the
table above place more emphasis on uncovering the cognitive and neurobiological basis
of willpower and self-control.
One possible explanation for why intrapersonal and intertemporal choice models
have become so diverse may have something to do with how the literature on time
preferences and choice inconsistency has developed. For example, Loewenstein (1996,
2000) and Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) are among the most frequently cited in the
behavioral economics literature with regard to the psychological underpinnings of
inconsistent preferences. Loewenstein and Metcalfe & Mischel both emphasize the
significance of visceral factors (e.g., cravings, sexual arousal, pain) and heightened
emotional states (e.g., “hot” states) as responsible for impulsive or unreflective choices.
Thus, the hot-cold heuristic has percolated throughout behavioral economics and has
been adopted by many as the default psychological model for the study of self-control
problems. In this way, the hot-cold heuristic serves nearly the same function that DPT
does—in fact, the only discernable difference between the hot-cold heuristic and DPT
is the disciplines from which they emerge: The hot-cold heuristic is more closely
associated with the psychometrics of willpower and delay-gratification, which has
close links to utility theory as it is employed in mathematical psychology.
2.2 The Increasing Popularity of Dualistic Decision Models in Economics
How do we reconcile the increasing popularity of dualistic models in behavioral
economics with the controversies surrounding DPT? One answer is that economists
simply aren’t familiar with the debates in cognitive science and philosophical psychol-
ogy about DPT, and thus shouldn’t be expected to know each and every criticism
against it (especially if those criticisms are still up for debate). However, it could also be
the case that behavioral economists think these criticisms do not apply to them, perhaps
because their descriptive aims are not so tied up in the explanatory power of DPT. As
we saw above, while some dualistic decision models are explicit about their commit-
ments to DPT (such as in the Heuristics and Biases tradition), many are not explicit
about this, either because they don’t recognize the historical links, or because they
interpret dual processing through another disciplinary frame. For this reason, it’s
difficult to know whether the controversies and criticisms of DPT carry over and have
implications for behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. To answer this question,
we need say a bit more about the possible roles that DPT plays in dualistic models.
Some dualistic decision models make use of neuroscientific evidence and appeal to
executive mechanisms and/or specialized sub-systems in the brain; these mechanisms
and sub-systems are believed to play a pivotal role in the execution of decisions and
thus are thought to be highly relevant to the analysis of rational choice. In these cases,
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which characterize its role in neuroeconomics, DPT not only provides empirical
support for dualistic modeling, but it possibly opens the proverbial black box by pin-
pointing physiological structures that have been left out of economic analysis in the
past (Camerer et al. 2005; Camerer 2007; cf. Bernheim 2009). Yet, the proportion of
dualistic models which rely on neuroscientific evidence is small. By contrast, the
majority of dualistic decision models in behavioral economics can be understood as
taking a purely functional (non-reductive) approach to the analysis of decisions. In
these cases, DPTcould be thought to provide a menu of mental processing types, which
would allow behavioral economists to make broader inferences about the etiology of
choice phenomena.
So, where does this leave us? As I stated in the introduction, the controversies and
criticisms brought against DPT give rise to a dilemma, one which requires behavioral
economists and neuroeconomists to reflect on their psychological commitments and
possibly revise their scientific ambitions. But it’s also possible that DPT could play
different descriptive roles with regard to dualistic decision modeling.
In the next two sections I show how the theoretical and empirical inadequacies of
DPT are directly relevant to economics: in section 3, I survey six essential criticisms
that have been raised against DPT from the perspective of cognitive science and
philosophical psychology; in section 4, I then examine how these criticisms impact
the descriptive accuracy of decision models, starting with specific instances in
neuroeconomics, and then segueing into behavioral economics for a more general
assessment.
3 Recent Developments in Dual Process Research
3.1 Taking a Closer Look at System 1 and System 2
Nearly all versions of DPT subscribe to the same basic idea, which is that human minds
rely on distinct types of mental processing to accomplish different tasks in daily life.5
It’s widely believed that these processes evolved for specific purposes and are designed
and attuned to respond to features of the external environment. As previously men-
tioned, the standard view distinguishes mental processes that are fast, reactive, auto-
matic, intuitive, heuristic, associative, and preconscious from mental processes that are
slow, controlled, reflective, serial, rule-based, and conscious. Mugg (2016) refers to this
as the “standard menu” of mental processes; I will refer to it as the standard menu
throughout this paper.
On the standard menu, processes come in two types. As previously mentioned, the
former is believed to be evolutionarily old and directly linked to autonomic functions,
such as ‘fight or flight’ responses and stimulus-bound perceptions. The latter set of
processes are believed to have evolved more recently and aid in higher cognitive
functionings that draw upon working memory and require sustained effort and attention
(Evans and Over 1996; Stanovich 2004). Classic experiments, such as the Wason
Selection Task (Evans and Wason 1976; Evans 1989) and Stroop Effect test (Stroop
5 For overviews of DPT’s applications and interpretations across psychology See Evans (2006, p. 208) and
Pennycook (2017).
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1935; Osman 2004), demonstrate how reasoning errors and biases depend largely on
the allocation of cognitive resources, which are determined by the automaticity of
information processing protocols. Certain processes—typically those associated with
older evolutionary structures—are easily primed and often trigger responses before an
individual can, say, consult a rule or deliberate about a problem. In the domain of
reasoning and decision-making, the effects of automatic and rapid processing can be
observed through misapplied decision heuristics and faulty reasoning, as well as
computational errors. These experiments are believed to give credence to the validity
of DPT.
If this sounds somewhat vague, however, it’s because DPT is vague. The constel-
lation of theories that make up DPT are better thought of as a generic framework than a
unified theory (Evans and Stanovich 2013a, b). Hence, a well-known defect of the
standard view is that it’s not obvious what distinguishes different mental processes
from one another, aside from the labels the theory ascribes to their functional roles.
Moreover, it’s difficult to know whether token theories utilizing the standard menu of
mental processes refer to the same thing. (This, it should be noted, is a problem for
functional explanations in psychology in general—Levin 2017). Consequently, the
standard view of DPT does not actually provide an account of how reasoning tasks
are accomplished, and decisions made; what it provides is a generic theory about the
potential origins of reasoning and decision errors. This, it would seem, is a major
deficiency for the theory: if it cannot explain how the mind inhibits or overrides bad
judgments that are generated by rapid or automatic mental processes, then what is the
point of making the distinction to begin with? After all, we don’t always submit to our
biases—we are often able to restrain gut-reactions and to recognize hasty errors for
what they are. But the fact that we frequently make reasoning errors under conditions of
risk and uncertainty indicates that much of our mental processing is not under con-
scious control.
Theorists have responded to this issue by positing separate modes of processing,
parsing the standard menu into discrete systems. These are most commonly known as
System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich 1999; Kahneman 2003a, b, 2011; Kahneman and
Frederick 2005); though, some authors have opted for less neutral terminology, refer-
ring to them as the Heuristic System and Analytic System, respectively (Stanovich 2004;
Evans 2006; cf. Evans and Stanovich 2013a). For an extensive overview of the
different clusters of attributes that are said to belong to System 1 and System 2, see
Evans (2006, 2008).
While the idea of separate cognitive systems has helped to synthesize many token
theories in the DPT literature, thereby alleviating some of the worry about terminolog-
ical discrepancies, perhaps the most important—and arguably the most controversial—
aspect of the System 1 / System 2 framework is the way the two systems are believed to
interact. One interpretation is that the systems are arranged sequentially: System 1
operates autonomously, with System 2 monitoring and intervening when it has the
power, i.e. energy resources, to do so. This is known as the “default-interventionist”
model. Another interpretation is that the two systems are arranged in parallel and must
compete for control over our behavior. This “parallel-competitive” model is appealing
given new evidence about the distribution of brain processes (Sinayev 2016; Lurquin
and Miyake 2017; Pennycook 2017). Yet, the consensus among many researchers, at
Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a... 113
least in the areas of reasoning and decision-making, is that this latter view is untenable
(cf. Evans 2008; Keren and Schul 2009).6
The reason why many seem to resist the parallel-competitive model of system interac-
tion is because it requires a more complex explanation about how System 1 and System 2
co-operate and reconcile conflict. For proponents of the default-interventionist model,
there is no conflict per se; System 1 operates autonomously and System 2 either intervenes
or it doesn’t. But on the parallel-competitive model, both systems are thought to generate
responses to input, and although System 2 can override System 1, the associative force of
System 1’s responses may block System 2’s attempts to intervene. While it is still a
debated issue which description better approximates the interaction of System 1 and
System 2, proponents of both agree that System 2 could not operate without System 1
because the higher cognitive functionings of System 2 depend on information received by
System 1 (cf. Evans and Stanovich 2013a). It’s important to keep in mind here that
“parallel” has different interpretations and can refer to or range over different operations
within a system. In this instance, parallel is meant to encompass the operations of both
System 1 and System 2, meaning that each system is designed to respond to unique inputs
and does not overlap or share functional characteristics with the other—in a word, they
operate autonomously. This can be contrasted from other instances of parallel and
distributed processing which occur at the intra-system level. For instance, some who
endorse the default-interventionist model readily acknowledge that within System 1 there
may exist many autonomous sub-systems which operate in parallel (isolated from one
another, but not isolated from the higher reflective processes of System 2). This is the basis
of Stanovich’s concept of The Autonomous Set of Systems which comprise the Heuristic
System (Stanovich 2004, 2011).
With this in mind, some have speculated that if System 1 and System 2 operated
independently of one another (which the parallel-competitive model suggests), then it
seems the only way they could meaningfully interact and compete for control over our
behavior is by way of a third system, which has access to the inputs and processes of both
System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich 2011; Varga and Hamburger 2014). Indeed, there is
growing neuroscientific support for the existence of executive control functions in the
brain, and some supporters of the system-based interpretation ascribe this function to
System 2. But the range of processes that this executive function has control over appears
to be limited (cf. Pennycook 2017); moreover, if executive control were a feature of
System 2, this would indicate that System 1 and System 2 are not isolated from another
(otherwise System 2 couldn’t perform its role as executor—Keren and Schul 2009). For
this reason, the default-interventionist model is, at least in the domain of decision-making,
the more plausible of the two models of system interaction.
Despite the proliferation of DPTs that use the terminology of System 1 and System
2, there are several outstanding criticisms of the systems-based interpretation—many of
6 Arguably, one could make the case for a third arrangement, wherein systems process information simulta-
neously (in parallel), but they are allowed to influence each other in complex, feedback interactions (Sinayev
2016). For the sake of space, I will not consider this interpretation of system interaction here for it is not
common in behavioral economic literature. Moreover, for reasons that will become evident in section 4, I
suspect that this arrangement would not be conducive to behavioral economic modeling since the utility
function of one system would presumably change upon feedback interactions with the system it is in
“competition” with. For alternative approaches to modeling system interactions in neuroeconomics, see
Krajbich and Dean (2015) and Konovalov and Krajbich (2019).
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which have not received due attention outside the cognitive sciences. Consider
the following three criticisms:
Criticism 1: Systems are not discrete. It is reasonable to think that System 1 and
System 2 roughly correspond to neuroanatomical differences in the brain; and, it’s
been suggested by many (with the support of brain imaging software) that some
functions of System 1 and System 2 can be correlated with domain-specific
modules and/or neural circuits (Mars et al. 2011; Botvinick and Cohen 2014;
Botvinick and Braver 2015). However, there is not sufficient evidence to warrant
identifying System 1 and/or System 2 with any fixed neural architecture (Osman
2004; Keren 2013). Rather, evidence indicates that many processes associated with
both systems “crosscut” each other for the sake of executing different functions
(Mugg 2016; Keren and Schul 2009; Evans and Stanovich 2013a). This has two
important consequences for the descriptive accuracy of DPT: firstly, it indicates that
System 1 and System 2 are not discrete—in fact, they may share or utilize similar neural
pathways for the completion of dissimilar tasks. This is not so surprising when one
considers that the standard menu of processes is characterized according to the functions
of System 1 and System 2, and these functions may be multiply realized depending on
the task at hand or the circumstances surrounding a task. Secondly, as Keren and Schul
(2009) have pointed out, the contrastive nature of System 1 and System 2 really is a
matter of degree, as mental processing occurs along a continuum (e.g., the dividing line
between “controlled” and “automatic” processing, as for many other mental processes, is
fuzzy and indistinct, and may be different for different individuals).
Criticism 2: Intersystem interactions are underdetermined by evidence. As briefly
described above, the issue as to whether systems are arranged in a sequential or
parallel fashion is very much a contingent (and debated) matter: it depends entirely
on how one defines the concept of a cognitive system and how this is fleshed out in
terms of its functional characteristics. Because it is not agreed upon what the
appropriate neuroanatomical correlates of System 1 and System 2 are, the story of
their interaction is mired in theoretical and terminological disputes. Although most
researchers prefer to believe that System 1 and System 2 are arranged sequentially,
there simply isn’t sufficient empirical evidence to validate either the default-
interventionist model or the parallel-competitive model of system interaction.
Recent meta-analyses and replication studies indicate that neither model is singu-
larly equipped to predict and explain how individuals reason and make decisions
(Sinayev 2016; Lurquin and Miyake 2017; cf. Pennycook 2017). The evidence
and counter-evidence to support both models could be interpreted as a fundamental
flaw in the theory itself.
Criticism 3: Evidence for dual systems is limited to laboratory settings. Finally,
there is growing consensus among critics that system-based interpretations of DPT
is predictive only insofar as it predicts behavior in highly controlled, laboratory
settings (Keren 2013; Buturovic and Tasic 2015). On the one hand, it has not been
proven that either system is solely responsible for reasoning errors (and, as we’ll
see in section 5, there are important reasons to believe that System 2 is not only
capable of reasoning errors, but that making occasional errors is part of its
function). On the other hand, the case has been repeatedly made that proponents
of the system-based interpretation (see e.g., Kahneman and Frederick) presupposes
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norms of rationality that based on rules of logic and probability theory. This
emphasis on testing peoples’ abilities to solve puzzles and perform computational
tasks in artificial conditions says little about their day-to-day reasoning abilities
(Gigerenzer and Regier 1996; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer 2011). It has been further argued that the system-based interpretation
of DPT relies on biased results, and that experimenters are selective in their
reporting of evidence (Gigerenzer 2015). It goes without saying that the above
criticisms have generated much controversy.7
3.2 Why the Type 1 / Type 2 Distinction doesn’t Escape Criticism
It could be argued that the above criticisms, while valid, do not undermine the
theoretical significance of DPT; rather, they merely demonstrate the limitations of
particular models and particular applications of it. For instance, Evans and Stanovich
(2013a, b) now acknowledge that the system-based interpretation of DPT has many
deficiencies. Though, they maintain that such criticisms also betray a confusion by
critics between theory and meta-theory, and they maintain that DPT—construed as a
meta-theory—has not been, or rather, cannot be refuted (Evans and Stanovich 2013b;
Pennycook 2017). What Evans & Stanovich mean by “meta-theory” is not altogether
clear. They claim that, “Broad frameworks, like dual-process theory, have a very
important role to play in psychology, and there are numerous examples of research
programs organized within and around such frameworks… What we can expect at this
level is general principles, coherence, plausibility, and the potential to generate more
specific models and the experiments to test them” (2013b, p. 263). As such, Evans and
Stanovich have since abandoned the system-based interpretation, arguing instead that
DPT is most plausible if mental processes are organized by a single dichotomy, namely,
their type; hence they adopt the terminology Type 1 and Type 2 to distinguish the
processes which they formerly attributed to the Heuristic System and Analytic System,
respectively.
While proponents of this new type-based interpretation are cautious not to overstate
the discreteness of Type 1 and Type 2 processes, they utilize many of the same
attributes to differentiate the two: Type 1 consists of autonomous processes that are
automatic and not under an individual’s conscious control, whereas Type 2 consists of
reflective processes that are typically associated with activities like language use,
mental simulation, and complex problem solving. However, what really sets Type 1 /
Type 2 apart from System 1 / System 2 is the role of working memory in higher-order
functionings (Evans and Stanovich 2013a).
Stanovich (2009) further modifies the type-based interpretation, positing that in
addition to the autonomous set of systems that make up Type 1, Type 2 processes
can be further bifurcated into distinct stages: the first stage involves what he calls
“algorithmic” processing, which initiates many of the monitoring and executive func-
tions that are associated with the Analytic System. It is only after algorithmic
7 Although Evans and Stanovich have elected not to use the terms “System 1” and “System 2” to characterize
DPT, they acknowledge that most of the criticisms presented above apply to their own conception of Heuristic
System and Analytic System.
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processing that the second stage of Type 2 processing is engaged, where genuine
“reflective” processing takes place (Stanovich 2011). The algorithmic stage of mental
processing is an important innovation in this model, as it is intended to mediate
between the autonomous set of systems while effectively priming information for
conscious manipulation. The significance of positing an algorithmic “level” is that it
is thought to account for discrepancies in the application of DPT, such as individual
differences in intelligence and cognitive ability. Nevertheless, there remain a number of
problems for this type-based interpretation of DPT. Now, consider three more
criticisms:
Criticism 4: Types do not distinguish mental processes. The restructuring of DPT
based on processing types was largely intended to solve the cross-cutting problem by
using the continuity of mental processes to its advantage. This works insofar as it side-
steps the issue of having to carefully demarcate separate systems; but it essentially pushes
the problem back a level and does not provide a solution to the ambiguity surrounding
mental processes (Keren 2013). While proponents like Evans and Stanovich may argue
thatworkingmemory is a sufficient criterion to distinguish the autonomous set of systems
from non-autonomous ones, this does little to improve understanding of the putative
menu of processes whichmake up Type 2 functionings. This “stripped down” version of
DPT makes the overall framework less precise, which makes one wonder whether it is
not simply a theory about working memory instead of a theory about reasoning and
decision-making (Keren 2013; Mugg 2016). I return to this issue in section 4.2.
Criticism 5: The criterion of “rule-based” reasoning is ambiguous. Both system-
based and type-based interpretations of DPT appeal to processes that are “rule-
based”. As argued by Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011), there seems to be much
equivocation in the use of the term “rule-based” as a criterion to distinguish types of
processes. On the one hand, “rule-based” could refer to the conscious effort of an
individual to adhere to rules (e.g., rules of normative conduct, rules of a game, rules
of arithmetic); but, on the other hand, “rule-based” could refer to unconscious
“computational” processes that aid in or underwrite cognitive tasks. For some,
namely those interested explicitly in the psychology of deductive reasoning, this
equivocation may not be much a problem, the property “rule-based” refers typically
to higher-order capacities to reason abstractly and perform mental simulations.
However, for those interested in the mental processes that support the learning of
implicit skills and other preconditions for reasoning and decision-making, this can
get confusing very quickly, as it’s not obvious whether the criterion refers to a
conscious ability of the individual to reason analytically, or whether it refers to the
ability to model some aspect of cognition according to rules.8 Evans and Stanovich
8 The discrepancy here about what it means to describe mental processes as ‘rule-based’ runs parallel to
debates in philosophy of cognitive science concerning the meaning and interpretation of “computation” in
computational theories of cognition (Van Gelder 1995; Thompson 2007; Miłkowski 2013a, b; Piccinini and
Bahar 2013; Piccinini 2015). The bone of contention is whether, or on what grounds, it makes sense to say that
the mind computes information, i.e. at the level of representations or at the level of neurophysiology (or in
between). Skeptics of computational theories of mind reject claims that human thinking is computational
because there is, as of yet, no evidence that anything akin to symbol-manipulation happens when thought is
produced (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017; Hutto et al. 2018; cf. Colombo 2014).
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(2013a, b) are not convinced this is a major issue, but criticism (6) indicates further
why it may turn out to be a worthy criticism.
Criticism 6: What does algorithmic processing refer to? The idea of algorithmic
processing was introduced to alleviate confusions about where and how Type 2
processes are initiated; Stanovich (2009, 2011) has argued that this innovation has
been very useful for explaining how implicit skills are developed and for account-
ing for individual differences in cognitive ability and intelligence. This very well
may be the case. But our problem is that it’s anything but clear how algorithmic
processes are realized, and how they differ—at the neuroanatomical level—from
other Type 2 processes, if they do at all. Stanovich uses primarily functional
terminology to portray the rule-based nature of algorithmic processes—but this
doesn’t alleviate the problem of mental processes cross-cutting each other, nor
does it clarify what it means to describe some mental processes as rule-based. We
are told that even though individuals are not conscious of algorithmic processes,
they are still considered Type 2 processes because they depend on working
memory and are representational in nature.
In sum, these additional criticisms suggest that type-based interpretations DPT may
obscure rather than clarify the idea that human reasoning and decision making is
inherently dualistic. Part of the reason for this is that many of the same reasoning
processes can be also described by a ‘one-system’model (Osman 2004; Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer 2011) or, as I mentioned above, models with many systems and stages
(Stanovich 2011; Varga and Hamburger 2014; Pennycook et al. 2015; Swan et al.
2018). This can be seen as a further justification for the claim that rational decision-
making cannot be reduced to the operations of single system, or in this instance, a
single type: Type 2 processes, like System 2 processes, do not guarantee rational
decision-making, and likewise, Type 1 processes, like System 1 processes, do not
necessarily produce irrational actions.
4 Two Styles of Dualistic Decision Modeling
In this section, I review two common styles of dualistic decision modeling in econom-
ics. The first style sees DPT identifying neural structures in the brain; the second style
sees DPT identifying functional characteristics of mental processes. Regarding the
former, I argue that because the standard view of DPT is not bound to any particular
neuroanatomical interpretation, dualistic decision models which utilize neuroscience
evidence may exaggerate or distort the roles that specialized mechanisms and/or sub-
systems play in the evaluation of prospects and execution of decisions. This puts into
perspective the relevance of criticisms (1–3) above for neuroeconomic research. Re-
garding the second style, I argue that when DPT is construed as a functional (non-
reductive) framework, it cannot explain how choice emerges from the interaction of
dual processes and/or dual systems without a supplemental story. This leaves behav-
ioral economists with two options: (i) bite the bullet and leave the black box closed; (ii)
use formal constructs from economics to work out the details of how dual processes
and/or systems interact. The problem with the latter option is that the explanatory value
of dualistic decision models becomes hostage to the explanatory value of DPT in
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general. This puts into perspective the relevance of criticisms (4–6) above for behav-
ioral economic research.
4.1 Dualistic Decision Models in Neuroeconomics
Camerer et al. (2005) (CLP) have championed the use of neuroscience to improve
economic theory. They emphasize that standard economic theory is inadequate because
it is unable to account for decision anomalies that result from “automatic” and
“emotional” processing which governs an extensive portion of human behavior. “Hu-
man behavior,” they argue, “requires a fluid interaction between controlled and auto-
matic process, and between cognitive and affective systems. However, many behaviors
that emerge from this interplay are routinely and falsely interpreted as being the product
of cognitive deliberation alone” (CLP, 2005, p. 11). Not surprisingly, one finds many
references to core texts from the DPT literature in support of CLP’s “two-dimensional”
neuroeconomic framework (e.g., Shiffrin and Schneider 1977; Sloman 1996;
Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992; Lieberman et al. 2002; Gollwitzer et al. 2004;
Kahneman and Frederick 2002); yet, CLP are also adamant that the contrastive
functions of automatic and controlled processing are indicative of separate emotional
and cognitive systems in the brain.
Unlike dualistic decision models in behavioral economics which merely pay lip-
service to neural evidence (see section 4.2), CLP believe that neuroscience can
illuminate how individuals form their preferences and can improve how economists
study rational choice.9 In searching for a neural basis for rational choice, CLP have
come to emphasize the importance of specialized mechanisms, such as the “executive
control” and “conflict monitoring” mechanisms, for understanding what differentiates
controlled from automatic processing. These mechanisms are taken to be responsible
for initiating “override” functions which suppress automatic impulses to act or con-
sume. For this reason, CLP have come to associate executive control and conflict
monitoring mechanisms with successful impulse control and delayed gratification in
intertemporal choice contexts:
Controlled processes occur mainly in the front (orbital and prefrontal) parts of the
brain. The prefrontal cortex (pFC) is sometimes called the “executive” region,
because it draws inputs from almost all other regions, integrates them to form
near and long-term goals, and plans actions that take these goals into account.
(Camerer et al. 2005, p. 17)10
9 CLP understand the notion of “rational behavior” as indicating a particular sort or kind of processing, namely
as deliberate and under conscious control. This is different from understanding “rational behavior” as behavior
being consistent with a set of axioms.
10 Similarly, McClure et al. claim that: “We have observed that choices between lesser immediate and greater
delayed rewards elicit activity in distinct neural systems that appear to favor different choice outcomes. That is,
intertemporal choice under these conditions elicits decisional conflict. A growing body of evidence suggests
that a dorsocaudal region of the ACC [dorsal anterior cingulate Cortex] responds to conflicts in processing…
This is consistent with findings from the current study in which we observed activity in a similar area of the
ACC that was greater for decisions involving choices between immediate and delayed rewards than for
choices between only delayed rewards. Such findings have been taken as evidence for a conflict-monitoring
function of ACC, which serves to detect conditions requiring the recruitment of cognitive control mechanisms
subserved by prefrontal cortex and associated structures” (2007, pp. 5803).
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For CLP, the mechanisms in question not only provide a clearer picture of how the
brain works, but they serve as a vehicle to track valuation procedures among separate
neural systems. This same view has been endorsed by other neuroeconomists, including
McClure et al. (2004, 2007) and Brocas and Carrillo (2008, 2014).
However, it’s easy to lose track of how the executive control and conflict monitoring
mechanisms relate to the DPT framework. For neuroeconomists like CLP and McClure
et al, the Cognitive System is analogous to System 2; hence, if executive control is what
prevents automatic and impulsive processing from running wild, then the mechanisms
responsible for executive control should be contained by, that is operate within, the
Cognitive System. But we may then wonder how these mechanisms resolve conflict
between separate cognitive and emotional neural systems and how they relate to
deliberation and rational choice. To take another example, Brocas and Carrillo (2014)
argue that the “central executive system” coordinates the tasks of separate sub-systems
by governing the flow of information between regions of the brain (cf. D’Esposito et al.
1995; Szameitat et al. 2002). Like CLP and McClure et al., Brocas & Carrillo also
regard the central executive system as crucial to understanding rational choice forma-
tion. Yet, the central executive system for Brocas & Carrillo is not under the individ-
ual’s control—it operates autonomously and is not accessible to introspection; for this
reason, it’s hard to know how conflict monitoring and executive control at the neural
level causally relate to controlled mental processing that we typically associate with
rational choice. It leads one to wonder whether the cognitive-emotional duality en-
dorsed by CLP and other neuroeconomists is really necessary to their purposes—after
all, it is the conflict monitoring and executive control mechanisms which are doing the
explanatory work, not the individual who must contemplate having immediate or
delayed rewards. These examples illustrate an important conceptual gap between
how DPT is conceived as a descriptive framework, and how neuroscientific evidence
fits into that framework.
Now, just because the standard view of DPT is not committed to a particular neural
interpretation doesn’t preclude one from speculating about the neural foundations of
certain functions, such as cognitive control. But if one invokes specialized mechanisms
or sub-systems then we ought to have some idea how these support DPT. CLP’s and
McClure et al’s two-system models are ambiguous with regard to what really deter-
mines individual’s preferences— the cognitive and emotional systems? The controlled
and automatic processes which comprise those systems? Or the executive control and
conflict monitoring sub-systems which govern the controlled and automatic processes?
There is clearly some sort of hierarchy here; but how it relates to and informs the
economic analysis of rational choice is left unspecified. Rather, CLP say things like
this:
Neuroscience is shot through with familiar economic language—delegation,
division of labor, constraint, coordination, executive function—but these con-
cepts are not formalized in neuroscience as they are in economics. There is no
overall theory of how the brain allocates resources that are essentially fixed (e.g.,
blood flow and attention). An “economic model of the brain” could help here.
Simple economic concepts, like mechanisms for rationing under scarcity, and
general versus partial equilibrium responses to shocks, could help neuroscientists
understand how the entire brain interacts. (Camerer et al. 2005, p. 56)
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There is surely merit to this claim as neuroeconomics is developing into an independent
sub-field of behavioral economics. But the question that arises is, if the logic of
economic theory is suited to analyze decisions as they are realized in the brain, as
CLP argue, then where—at what point in the causal decision process—should eco-
nomic models focus? At the penultimate moment of execution? Or across different
decision nodes? This question is important not just for understanding how dualistic
decision models envision the use of neuroscientific evidence, but also for understand-
ing what rational choice consists in for models like CLP’s.
It is useful to introduce a distinction here between two styles of neuroeconomics.
The approach of CLP and McClure et al., which uses neuroscientific methods to elicit
and characterize individuals’ preferences, has been dubbed “behavioral economics in
the scanner” (BES) (Harrison and Ross 2010). This approach can be contrasted with
what has alternatively been called “economics of neural activity” (ENA) (Vromen
2011) which uses econometric methods to study the neurobiology of the brain. It is
the former style of neuroeconomics that we are here concerned: Unlike ENA, propo-
nents of BES rely on dualistic properties to depict where and how rational choice is
executed (when it is executed properly). According to proponents of ENA, the idea of
partitioning the brain into spatially distinct valuation systems, as CLP and McClure
et al. do, is misguided—there is really one single valuation system (cf. Parker and
Newsome 1998; Thompson and Schall 1999; Glimcher 2003).
Vromen (2011) suggests that the disagreement between proponents of BES and
ENA over how many valuation systems there are in the brain can be reconciled by
instead thinking in terms of “upstream and downstream phases in the total causal chain
of decision-making in the brain” (2011, p. 278, my emphasis). Hence, it may after all be
the case that there are multiple regions and circuits responsible for “upstream” valua-
tion which fit CLP and McClure et al’s dualistic picture of the decision-maker; but
along the way, these valuations converge to a single phase or node, which requires an
alternative picture of the execution processes, and hence, an alternative model of the
mind / brain.
The message to take away here is not that economic models cannot interface with
neuroscience to produce more realistic models of individual decision-making; but
doing so via DPT runs the risk of distorting (by overemphasizing) the role of certain
mechanisms in that process. This speaks to the significance of criticisms 2 and 3 above,
which suggests that not only is the story of the interaction of systems descriptively
ambiguous, but also that this story is underdetermined by contemporary neuroscientific
evidence. For those who practice BES-style neuroeconomics, the mechanisms respon-
sible for executive control and valuation (which comprise the cognitive and emotional
systems and which produce controlled and automatic processes) are only part of the
story. If CLP and McClure et al. ultimately agree with proponents of ENA that the final
phases of decision-making are integrated into a single causal stream, then DPT is useful
only insofar as it potentially represents upstream stages of decision-making prior to
integration. After integration, only one system is in operation.
One might then wonder why neuroeconomists need DPT at all given that its
representation of decision-making processes is (at best) incomplete and (at worst)
amenable to distortion. According to CLP and McClure et al., it is only through
studying the contrastive features of controlled and automatic processing in the brain
that behavioral economists will be able to refine and reform standard economic theory.
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Perhaps there is something to this. But it is far from evident that DPT is best or even a
reliable framework for depicting such processes in the brain.
4.2 Dualistic Decision Models in Behavioral Economics
The section above summarizes a limiting set of cases: it indicates that DPT
may be descriptively inadequate to represent and analyze decision processes in
the brain. But the case could be made that if these inadequacies constitute a
problem at all, it is only a problem for neuroeconomic applications of DPT, not
for behavioral economics in general. Rather, it is much more likely that
behavioral economists view DPT as a functional (non-reductive) psychological
framework, one which provides approximate descriptions of decision procedures
based on the standard menu of mental processes (or something like that). On
this view, the predictive and/or explanatory power of dualistic decision models
is independent of whatever neural structures are involved in decision-making
and thus is unaffected by such descriptive problems. This functional interpre-
tation would be closer in-step with the putative aims of behavioral economics
according to, e.g., Angner and Loewenstein (2012) and Angner (2019). Yet, I
will argue that this functional interpretation nevertheless generates more, not
less, confusion about the role that DPT plays with regard to behavioral econ-
omists scientific ambitions. There are two aspects to this.
First, how dualistic decision models in behavioral economics understand the inter-
action of dual processes and/or systems is rarely if ever explicitly formulated. Recall
that, in addition to the lack of neural evidence for demarcating dual processes and
systems in the brain (see criticisms 2 and 3), criticism 1 indicates that mental processes
operate on a continuum and are not functionally discrete—which is to say different
mental processes may crosscut each other or operate jointly to serve different functions.
While proponents of DPT (such as Evans and Stanovich 2013a) see this as an effect of
the generalization of the standard menu of mental processes, it’s important that
researchers understand that the crosscutting problem is an inherent challenge for any
functional interpretation of DPT. For this reason, the story of how dual processes and/or
systems interact is left in the black box.
While some behavioral economists seem to be willing to bite the bullet and forego
providing any explanation of system interaction, others have attempted to overcome
this issue by interpreting mental processes formally, using the tools of economic
analysis to flesh out the details. For example, it has become a common tactic among
behavioral economists to use principal-agent models and limited-information games to
represent the internal dynamics of decision-making in the context of intrapersonal and
intertemporal choice—see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Bernheim and Rangel
(2004), Benhabib and Bisin (2005), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005), Fudenberg
and Levine (2006). As such, what determines whether one system or type of processes
overrides and intervenes on another is contingent upon the bargaining or constraining
power of that system or type of processes construed as an economic agent. Familiar
psychological concepts such as willpower and cognitive control, which are often
associated with the capacity for rational self-control, are thus derived from the math-
ematics of the model. The details of how DPT’s functional characteristics may map
onto these formal constructs has been discussed by Grayot (2019), so I will not repeat
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them here. Yet, the central raised by Grayot, which is applicable here, is whether these
formal constructs possibly misconstrue how dual systems and/or dual types of mental
processes produce choice at all. To understand how this relates back to the first three
criticisms, consider again the parallel-competitive and default-interventionist interpre-
tations of system interaction.
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) propose a model of system interaction
which is quite similar to the default-interventionist model. Their model pre-
sumes that the Affective System is active by default, whereas the Deliberative
System requires energy resources to play the part of monitor and intervener.
Now, why they adopt this model and not something closer to the parallel-
competitive model is unknown, since there is not much background discussion
about it. One reason to forego the parallel-competitive model might be that the
default-interventionist model presumes the rational authority of the Deliberative
System (the Deliberative System has a kind of agency which enables it to
propose a menu of choices to constrain the Affective System); the parallel-
competitive model of system interaction does not lend itself to such an inter-
pretation. In fact, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) state that their model
relegates the impulses and motivations of the Affective System to an exogenous
variable, which is fixed independently of the valuations of the Deliberative
System (2005, p. 6). One gets the impression the default-interventionist model
is popular among behavioral economists not because it is the most realistic
(supported by neuroscientific evidence), but because it is the most flexible with
regard to its application to different choice contexts. Here’s why:
The criteria by which DPT distinguishes the functional characteristics of mental
processes are few and open-ended. While there are endless number of interpretations of
DPT in the cognitive sciences and psychology, the case has been made that what
ultimately demarcates slow, controlled, and reflective mental processes from fast, reactive,
and automatic ones rests on just basic two criteria: autonomy of operation and the
requirement of working memory (Evans and Stanovich 2013b; cf. Thompson 2013). On
this interpretation, it’s easy to see how DPT can be leveraged to characterize any number
of decision anomalies.
But this gives rise to a more fundamental question, namely, if autonomy and
working memory are all that is required to justify demarcating and ascribing mental
processes to some choice phenomenon, what does it take to possibly refute DPT?
Consider the following passage by Pennycook:
The observation that the distinction between intuition and reflection is
irrefutable is foundational because it means that dual-process models
should not be concerned with justifying this claim. That is, dual-process
models must take this distinction as a given and build from there. If we
know with a reasonable degree of certainty that the mind has this capacity
for two different types of processes (autonomous and non-autonomous),
where do we go from there? […] Thus, the mere distinction between
intuition and reflection based on autonomy is sufficient for the claim that
dual-process theory is irrefutable, but not sufficient for the claim that the
theory is worth anyone’s time. (2017, p. 8)
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Although Pennycook does not regard this foundational aspect of DPT to be inherently
problematic,11 this should raise at least some alarms with regard to the scientific
ambitions of behavioral economists. One need not be card-carrying Popperian to see
that irrefutability may run contrary to the aims of behavioral economics, which are “to
improve the realism and psychological assumptions underlying economic theory”
(Camerer 1999). If DPT is thus construed as a functional framework, its theoretic
structure allows for virtually unlimited interpretation. I return to this issue in the next
section.
Of course, one could retort that DPT is better construed as a meta-theory than a first-
order theory. As Evans & Stanovich continue to argue in defense of DPT, “such
frameworks [meta-theories] cannot be falsified by the failure of any specific instanti-
ation or experimental finding. Only specific models tailored to the tasks can be refuted
in that way…” (2013b, p. 263). According to Evans & Stanovich, this is precisely why
the System 1 /System 2 distinction is misleading—it gives the impression that the
various dichotomies underlying DPT are strict and consistent across token theories—
which we now know not to be the case. Hence, they abandon the system-based
interpretation of DPT and commit to (what they believe is) a single, more coherent,
dichotomy between autonomous processes and those which require working memo-
ry—this, recall, is the Type 1/Type 2 distinction, which they endorse as the least
problematic interpretation of DPT (cf. Evans 2017).
5 DPT and the Myth of the Inner Rational Agent
Where does this leave us? It would seem that, due to the descriptive inadequacies of
DPT, both styles of dualistic decision modeling have considerable limitations. One may
then ask: what justifies taking a dualistic perspective about decision modeling at all? In
this section, I consider an alternative reason for DPT’s popularity, one which trades on
its fundamental irrefutability. I speculate that DPT appeals to behavioral economists
because it satisfies modeling needs that are normative in origin: for economists, DPT is
not a theory about how decisions are made, but a theory about why rational agents
tend to deviate from the core tenets of microeconomic rationality. On this interpretation,
System 2 (and its various analogs) corresponds to an inner rational agent, one that
would otherwise abide by the norms of expected utility theory were it not for the
failures of System 1.12 Although I take this to be the most plausible reason for DPT’s
popularity in economics, I will argue that even this interpretation is not entirely
justif ied. In particular, I argue that neither system-based nor type-
11 He states, the “true test of a good theory is whether it can be applied successfully to problems and generate
hypotheses” (Pennycook 2017, p. 8).
12 The arguments developed in this section run parallel to those presented in Sahlin et al. (2010) who argue
that decision theorists have often treated System 2 as an “approximation” of what Edwards (1954) referred to
as “Normative Man”. I am highly sympathetic to Sahlin, Wallin, and Persson’s claims that DPT lacks a “firm
conceptual framework” and is inadequate to the purposes of decision theory, especially in the tradition of
Prospect theory. However, as shown in section 2, the links between DPT and economic decision research
extend beyond decision theory. Thus, to avoid conflating my own arguments with theirs, I have adopted the
term “inner rational agent” from Infante et al. (2016) who likewise observe that behavioral economists have
come adopt a dualistic perspective of human agents, one in which the rational economic agent is trapped inside
an “outer psychological shell”.
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based interpretations of DPT establish a clear basis for demarcating rational from
irrational decision processes. This puts into perspective and exemplifies the second
set of criticisms raised in section 2, viz. criticisms 4–6.
5.1 System 2 / Type 2 Processes aren’t Necessarily Rational
For ordinary persons, what counts as rational action is a matter of degree and
often context-dependent. The same cannot be said of economic agents—
rationality is judged according to whether choice-behavior is consistent with
expected utility theory. For this reason, the contrastive features of DPT appear
to be tailor-made for economists: having the ability to distinguish between
mental processes that generate reasoning errors and mental processes that don’t
is a critical tool for the analysis of rational choice. As already indicated, many
consider System 2 (or some analog of it) to be the “rational system”: this is not
just because it supports higher cognitive functionings, like hypothetical and
counter-factual thinking, but also because it is associated with the detection
and inhibition of biased judgments and impulsive behaviors. But is it safe to
presume that System 2 always produces rational outcomes? The answer is no;
but to understand why, we need to clarify things.
Firstly, when proponents of DPT refer to the rational capacities of System 2,
this is based on a standard of rationality that is rooted in the norms of
deductive logic and probability theory (Evans and Over 1996; Gigerenzer
1996; Stanovich 1999; Stein 1996). Although this normative standard has been
a point of much contention in the philosophy and psychology of human
reasoning (cf. Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Samuels et al. 2012; Samuels,
& Stich 2004; Over 2004), we can set it aside for now. Secondly, System 2 is
often identified with critical thinking. Critical thinking, according to the Amer-
ican Philosophical Association, is defined as “purposeful, self-regulatory judg-
ment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well
as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or
contextual consideration upon which that judgment is based” (Facione 1990).
But what does it mean to identify System 2 with successful critical thinking? It
could mean that (i) System 2 is a necessary condition (prerequisite) for critical
thinking; or it could mean that (ii) System 2 is sufficient for critical thinking,
which is to say, that all instances of System 2 processing are instances of
critical thinking (Bonnefon 2018). It’s not difficult to imagine why the latter
interpretation isn’t realistic. Not only is System 2 operative during all ordinary
activities that don’t meet requirements of critical thinking (e.g., reading a book
engages many System 2 processes, like mental simulation and hypothetical
thinking, but this does not count as an instance of critical thinking); more
importantly, there are instances where higher cognitive functions, like reflection
and deliberation, cause people to make mistakes that may not have otherwise
occurred. Bonnefon (2018) gives two examples of errors that result solely from
System 2 processing: one is related to false justification or what he calls
“pseudo-rational” answers. Often people follow their initial impulses and seek
to justify them through clever rationalizations. This would support classic
studies by Nisbett and Ross (1980) which reveals that individuals may give
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false verbal reports to justify actions they had no control over—often they do
this without realizing the report is false. Another example of System 2 failure is
the result of over-thinking, in which a person may mix-up or confuse relatively
simple information by deliberating on it.13 While these examples of System 2
errors are not as systematic as those commonly attributed to System 1 by
proponents of heuristics and biases research, they illustrate an important point,
which is that System 2 processing does not guarantee critical thinking and,
moreover, does not prohibit reasoning errors from occurring. For this reason, it
would be mistaken to presume, as many dualistic decision models tacitly do,
that System 2 is rational by default, or rather, that if System 2 is rational then
engaging system 2 precludes reasoning errors.
How does this relate to DPT and the concept of the inner rational agent? An
important aspect of many system-based interpretations of DPT is that individuals make
reasoning errors when System 2 does not have the resources to monitor or inhibit
System 1 functions. A successful completion of System 2 thinking is said to pass three
stages, conflict detection, sustained inhibition, explicit resolution (De Neys and
Bonnefon 2013; Pennycook et al. 2015; Stanovich and West 2009). Yet, if one thinks
that rationality is defined according to the norms of logic and probability theory, then it
reveals that System 2 does not guarantee rational action—in fact, because rationality is
based on coarser standards than critical thinking, it’s likely that violations of rationality
by System 2 are more common than instances of non-critical thinking—one can very
easily make calculation errors while thinking critically about a decision. Of course, this
only addresses the strictest associations of System 2 with rational choice.
Let’s now consider the former disjunct, that System 1 is the primary cause of
reasoning errors. While the above argument implies that System 1 is not the sole cause
of reasoning errors (viz. because System 2 is sometimes involved), proponents of
“ecological rationality” (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Gigerenzer 2004, 2007, 2008;
Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009) argue that it is inappropriate to presume that rationality
is constituted by the norms of deductive logic and probability theory. Many useful
heuristics are generated by mental processes associated with System 1, not all of which
lead to reasoning errors. Even if these processes are evolutionarily old and not
conducive to modern choice contexts, automatic and implicit processing is necessary
for many higher-reasoning tasks. Yet, the reason why decision researchers and econ-
omists treat these processes as inherently irrational is because they help to predict a
small range of decision phenomena that are relevant for some economic purposes.
Hence, supporters of ecological rationality maintain that DPT presupposes its norma-
tive assumptions: if the reason for adopting System 1 and System 2 is that it adheres the
normative standards of deductive logic and probability theory, this begs the question
(Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012).
But perhaps this is only a problem for the system-based interpretation of DPT, which
we’ve now seen to have difficulties demarcating separate mental processes. What if
13 Support for both kinds of System 2 errors are discussed in Mercier and Sperber (2011) who argue that one
of the functions of System 2 is the production of arguments. In this sense, an argument is a complex
representation of propositions and a conclusion which is derivable from those propositions. It’s possible for
a well-functioning System 2 to incur reasoning errors as a result of trying to convince others of an argument
rather than trying to arrive at true beliefs. This explains problematic rationalizations and other forms of
confirmation bias (see Mercier and Sperber 2011, pg. 63–66, for discussion).
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economists were to adopt a subtler, less metaphysically loaded framework for the
analysis of rational choice? For instance, would the type-based, as opposed to sys-
tem-based, interpretation of DPT help alleviate these issues? The answer is probably
not.
Firstly, proponents of the type-based interpretation of DPT do not agree on the
source of reasoning errors. As critics have argued, this may have something to do with
the fact that the Type 1/Type 2 distinction does not solve the cross-cutting issue (as
described by criticism 1); instead, it compounds the issue by generalizing the functional
characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 mental processes. For this reason, criticism 4
extends the cross-cutting issue to include type-based interpretations of DPT, rendering
them incapable of attributing reasoning errors to specific mental processes.
Secondly, even more sophisticated versions of the type-based interpretation of DPT,
such as Stanovich’s tri-process model (2009; 2011) seem to be unable to attribute
reasoning errors to specific mental processing types. Recall that, for Stanovich, Type 2
processes are comprised of two stages, an algorithmic stage and a reflective stage.
Unlike the reflective stage, the algorithmic stage is not accessible to introspection; it
operates below the threshold of conscious awareness and is primarily responsible for
initiating override procedures that persons then experience (at the reflective stage) as
exerting cognitive control or willpower or whatever it is that enables them to stave off
impulsive action and perform rational actions. It thus may be tempting to think that the
algorithmic stage is partly responsible for some reasoning errors, and further, that the
reflective stage is ultimately responsible for rational action. The reason that this tri-
process model can’t help economists establish which mental processing types are
responsible for reasoning errors is because it doesn’t commit to a clean distinction
between the algorithmic and reflective processing. As criticisms 5 and 6 indicate,
though there are plenty of candidate structures at the neuroanatomical which could
support algorithmic stage operations, Stanovich’s portrayal of the algorithmic stage
eschews most neural interpretations.14 Given that he understands algorithmic process-
ing as a set of functional, rule-bound procedures that facilitate reflective processing,
there is no theoretical reason why the reflective stage of Type 2 couldn’t also be
involved in reasoning errors. When individuals (unknowingly) justify mistakes or
attempt to assimilate impulsive behaviors with pseudo-rational answers, this must pass
through the reflective stage. This serves as a further reason for not giving Type 2
processes full rational authority.
For the purposes of rational choice analysis, it thus seems that neither system-based
nor type-based interpretations of DPT justify a belief in the concept of an inner rational
agent. Even if behavioral economists concede that the interactions between System 1
and System 2 (or Type 1 and Type 2) are only an approximation of the internal
dynamics of decision making, it would require significant deviations from DPT to
14 Stanovich (2011) uses psychometric data to make a compelling case for the role of the algorithmic stage in
Type 2 processing (even if it’s not clear what underwrite those processes). His argument rests on claims that
individual differences in cognitive ability are indications that something, prior to reflective processing, has
override control of Type 1 processes. The reason why these processes simply aren’t relegated to Type 1 is
because they are not intrinsically autonomous; rather, they are learned and internalized with practice. Reading
comprehension and arithmetical skills are examples of learned skills. The case has been made that such data
relies on question-begging assumptions and driven by confirmation bias (Polonioli 2014).
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continue to promote dualistic decision models which presume that somewhere, within
the individual, is a rational agent.
6 Concluding Remarks: On Scientific Ambitions and Normative
Commitments
To recap, I’ve argued that behavioral economists are faced with a dilemma: either they
stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-
making and give up the dual process narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific
ambitions. Section 2 surveyed both the explicit and implicit influences of DPT upon
economics and posited that there are two general styles of dualistic decision modeling,
behavioral economic and neuroeconomic. In section 3, I provided an overview of the
current status of DPT from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophical
psychology; I elaborated six criticisms of DPT, three of which pertain to system-based
interpretations (upon which the standard menu of mental processes is commonly
defined), and three more criticisms which pertain to recent type-based modifications
of DPT. The take-away message of section 3 is that DPT is not as descriptively accurate
as it is often portrayed to be, and therefore, not a reliable framework for depicting
mental processing: it posits structures that it cannot articulate and processes that it
cannot track. Section 4 considered whether the use of DPT generates tensions for
either of the two styles of dualistic modeling and discusses their possible limitations. In
Section 5.1 I argued that, at best, DPT provides a narrative upon which behavioral
economists can base their models—the idea that within each person is an inner rational
agent allows economists to interpret deviations from expected utility theory as the
outcome of irrational or non-rational processes. But even this narrative role would
require further justification given that System 2 / Type 2 processing can incur reasoning
errors (and in some contexts, System 1 / Type 1 processing may be sufficient for
rational action). In sum, not only is DPT subject to intense scrutiny as a general theory
of mental processing, but the versions of DPT that many economists subscribe to is a
not a faithful representation of either system-based or type-based interpretations of it.
They are often caricatured versions of DPT.
However, one can envision a few reasons why behavioral economists and
neuroeconomists may not be convinced by the arguments above, and further, may not
wish to give up on the dual process narrative. For instance, it could be argued that
despite its theoretical challenges, DPT is nevertheless a plausible (meta-)theory, and this
is all that behavioral economic research demands of its psychological foundations. This
line of reasoning is to be expected. For instance, Angner & Loewenstein claim that:
These days, as it is typically employed, “behavioral economics” refers to
the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic
theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations.
(2012, p. 1)
…many behavioral economists believe that social and behavioral science should
aspire to reveal the actual causes of behavior… On this view, the psychological
plausibility of underlying assumptions, and the accuracy of predictions matter for
the assessment of a theory. They matter because psychological plausibility and
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predictive accuracy are seen as indications that the theory “has pinned down the
right causes,” not because they matter in and of themselves. (2012, p. 36-7)
In fact, behavioral economists may not be willing to give up on DPT precisely because
it’s way of partitioning the mind/brain is naturally attuned to the needs of economic
analysis. The idea that System 2 (Type 2) would otherwise make rational decisions
were it not for System 1 (Type 1) allows economists to retain the neoclassical ideal of
rationality while accounting for deviations from this ideal. In other words, it establishes
a point of reference from which less-than-rational behavior can be measured and
modeled. This point has been forcefully argued by Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) who
claim that behavioral economics is just neoclassical economics in “disguise”. While it
is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether the normative standards of
neoclassical rationality are psychologically justified, and whether the caricature version
of DPT that dualistic economic models often subscribe to corresponds to normative
standards of rationality held by proponents of DPT in psychology and cognitive
science, it is worth considering what a refusal to give up DPT says about the scientific
ambitions of behavioral economists (assuming they are not swayed by theoretical and
empirical criticisms raised above).
Berg & Gigerenzer question this scientific ambition in the following inquiry:
Insofar as the goal of replacing [the] idealized assumptions [of neoclassical
economics] with more realistic ones accurately summarizes the behavioral eco-
nomics program, we can attempt to evaluate its success by assessing the extent to
which empirical realism has been achieved. Measures of empirical realism natu-
rally focus on the correspondence between models on the one hand, and the real-
world phenomena they seek to illuminate on the other… given its claims of
improved realism, one is entitled to ask howmuch psychological realism has been
brought into economics by behavioral economists (Berg & Gigerenzer 2012–2)
Berg & Gigerenzer assert that behavioral economics does not achieve empirical realism on
multiple fronts.15 But, what stands out between Angner and Loewenstein (2012) and Berg
and Gigerenzer’s (2010) appraisal of the scientific aims of behavioral economics is the
difference between commitments to psychological plausibility and psychological reality.
Apologists of the dual process narrative may be inclined to agree with Angner &
Loewenstein that because DPT is plausible and because it affords better predictions and
explanations of decision phenomena than neoclassical models, there is nothing scandalous
in choosing to overlook its known deficiencies. Afterall, if psychological plausibility and
predictive accuracy are indications that the theory “has pinned down the right causes”
(cf. Camerer et al. 2003, 4), then this seems to be justification enough to stick with DPT.
Apologistsmay dismiss Berg&Gigerenzer’s criticisms from empirical realism as exceeding
15 They characterize this by way of three methodological limitations: (i) “restrictions on what counts as an
interesting question,” (ii) “timidity with respect to challenging neoclassical definitions of normative rational-
ity,” and (iii) “confusion about fit versus prediction in evaluating a model‘s ability to explain data” (Berg and
Gigerenzer 2010, p. 3).
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the call of economic duty. The psychological plausibility of DPT permits one to model
decisions as the outcome of dual processes.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it rests on a subtle equivocation—
namely, that the right causes correspond with the actual causes. While behavioral and
social science may aspire to identify the actual causes of decision phenomena, as Angner
& Loewenstein claim, both economists and psychologists enjoy a certain latitude in
deciding what are the right causes according to their favorite theories. I’ve argued
throughout this paper that DPT is not descriptively accurate with regard to the actual
causes of decision phenomena; and I suggested above in section 5.1 that DPT’s staying
power in behavioral economics is due to the fact that it supposedly provides psychological
foundations for rational choice by treating System 2 (Type 2) as an inner rational agent.
But if these foundations are based on a caricature of DPT, one which oversimplifies the
role and function of disparatemental processes in the production of rational (and irrational)
behavior, then the right causes have effectively come apart from the actual causes.
If the right causes don’t reflect the actual causes, then we should like to know how
DPT increases the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory? If neoclas-
sical economics is taken as the descriptive benchmark, then of course dualistic decision
models constitute increased explanatory and predictive power. But the challenge to
answering this question is that we often don’t know what is the benchmark against
which a model successfully predicts or explains phenomena. This paper has provided
plenty of reasons to think that DPT is descriptively inaccurate regarding the actual
causes of decision-making processes—I therefore leave it an open question whether
dualistic economic models serve alternative scientific purposes.16
What about the increased predictive power of dualistic economic models? A
recurring criticism in Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) (see also Gigerenzer 2015) against
behavioral economics is the failure of researchers to provide genuine out-of-sample
predictions. They argue:
Given that many behavioral economics models feature more free parameters than
the neoclassical models they seek to improve upon, an adequate empirical test
requires more than a high degree of within-sample fit… Arguing in favor of new,
highly parameterized models by pointing to what amounts to a higher R-squared
(sometimes even only slightly higher) is, however, a widely practiced rhetorical
form in behavioral economics. (2010, p. 15)
Berg & Gigerenzer proceed to give examples of this rhetorical practice in different
domains of economics, including judgment and decision-making in the Heuristics and
Biases tradition as well as intertemporal choice and hyperbolic discounting. While not
all of their target models are dualistic, there is an affinity between their charges against
behavioral economists who overstate the predictive power of their models and
the criticisms raised here against DPT in social and cognitive psychology. The take
away message here is not that dualistic decision models in behavioral economics
couldn’t make novel predictions or couldn’t provide useful explanatory frameworks
for organizing behavioral data; but that, insofar as we don’t have clearly articulated
16 Though, Heilmann (2016) raises doubts about the unificatory potential of DPT for economic purposes.
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success conditions, the known theoretical and empirical deficiencies of DPT call into
question how exactly dualistic models predict and explain decision phenomena.
Finally, one might respond that my criticisms of dualistic decision models and my
argument that economists are confronted with a dilemma over-generalizes behavioral
economic practices—that, at best, the deficiencies of DPT have only limited relevance to
the disciplines on the whole. I am sympathetic to this response. Indeed, it was not the aim
of this paper to make grand assertions or presumptions about the goals, methods, and/or
theoretical commitments of behavioral economists or neuroeconomists in general. As
indicated in the first two sections, this is because behavioral economics is a heterogenous
discipline; much of what is now recognized to be bona fide behavioral economic research
has its roots in experimental psychology as well as cognitive (neuro)science, and the
increase in interdisciplinarity has led to fuzzier borders separating economic from non-
economic concepts and evidence. It would, in fact, make little sense to apply any broad
generalizations—critical or otherwise—to behavioral economics.
Nevertheless, the dilemma I’ve posed in this paper indicates that if behavioral
economists and neuroeconomists are not swayed by the growing criticisms against
DPT, then the burden of justification is upon them to clarify what are their scientific
aims in utilizing DPT. Economists are of course permitted to pick and choose which-
ever theoretical frameworks best suit their modeling needs; but the scientific commu-
nity is also permitted to inquire what is the scientific value of their models, especially
when there are known deficiencies in their theoretical assumptions.
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